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ABSTRACT
The newly revised Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and developments under the Federal Rules of
Evidence have a significant impact on the use, collection, and treatment of digital evidence for legal
proceedings. The Rules now formally grant electronic documents and digital evidence the same status
as paper and other forms of tangible evidence. As a result, the availability and proper preservation of
potentially relevant electronic evidence must be considered, at the very latest, in the preliminary stages
of litigation and, at the earliest, as soon as litigation is reasonably anticipated. It is important for
professionals to be familiar with the specific rules and developing laws pertaining to the preservation
and production of digital evidence prior to an incident or the initial stages of litigation and discovery.
Keywords: digital forensics, electronic discovery, evidence production, privilege, civil procedure
1. INTRODUCTION
The new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure strive to accommodate the daunting challenges of the
digital era of modern litigation. Like it or not, digital litigation is upon us, and many professionals,
must begin learning the rules of the digital game. According to a 2004 Survey conducted by the
American Management Association and The ePolicy Institute, “One in five U.S. companies (20%) has
had employee e-mail subpoenaed in the course of a lawsuit or regulatory investigation, up from 14%
in 2003. Another 13% have battled workplace lawsuits triggered by employee e-mail” [1]. In response
to a 2005 litigation trends survey, corporate counsel identified ediscovery as the number one new
litigation burden for companies [9]. “The advent of electronic discovery, coupled with more stringent
record keeping requirements, has exponentially added to the burdens imposed by litigation,” said
Robert D. Owen, a Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP litigation partner and leader of the firm’s records
management and e-discovery practice group [9].
What’s more, the digital dilemma dawns long before litigation erupts. An increasing number of
business and legal investigations include evidence extracted from digital devices such as computer
hard drives, PDAs and cell phones. When it becomes apparent that digital information must be used in
the course of an investigation or discovery process, forensics experts should be employed to carefully
identify, gather, preserve, and examine pertinent evidence. The “snapshot” of information from a
digital device must be collected in a detailed and methodical manner, since any or all evidence
collected can be used in discovery, depositions, or trial. The new Federal Rules give general guidelines
as to the discussion and handling of electronic documents in modern litigation. This paper briefly
highlights key components of the new rules and other basic digital evidence issues with which legal,
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forensics and information technology professionals, and their clients or businesses should become
familiar.
2. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
While the Federal Rules of Evidence have not been modified, careful attention must be given to how
courts are applying them to digital evidence. Counsel should consider ultimate issues of admissibility
as soon as sources of potentially relevant digital evidence are identified for preservation and
collection. As the use of paper declines and the reliance on digital information soars, more and more
cases are turning on the admissibility of electronic information. The admissibility of electronically
stored data often depends on how it is collected, preserved, and produced. Courts are imposing high
standards for the collection and analysis of digital evidence to ensure its authenticity under Rule 901.
Establishing authenticity often hinges on the testimony of digital forensic experts, whose opinions
must pass the scrupulous reliability test imposed by Rule 702 and the standards developed under
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993), and its progeny.
2.1 Authenticity of Digital Evidence
Authentication of digital evidence, like paper, “requires evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what its proponent claims” [11]. If the judge decides there is sufficient
evidence for a jury to conclude that the evidence is authentic, then the judge will deem the evidence
admissible. Actually deciding the authenticity of the evidence is left to the jury, who will determine
the weight given to evidence after it has been subjected to vigorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and instructions from the judge on the burden of proof.
Authenticating digital evidence presents unique challenges. With paper records, modifications can be
readily discerned and the author or custodian identified by a signature or writing style. In contrast,
alterations of electronic information can be difficult or impossible to detect and the author or creator
may be impossible to discern.
Like paper, electronic records can be authenticated with direct or circumstantial evidence. The creator
of an excel spreadsheet, for example, could provide direct testimony of authorship. The problem,
however, is the ease with which digital information can be altered, destroyed, or manufactured in a
convincing way. This can even be accomplished intentionally or accidentally by a novice computer
user, and is, according to one expert, “alarming” [14]. The reality is that proving the integrity of
digital evidence requires the use of digital forensic experts with the knowledge, skill, and experience
to use and apply an array of complex methods and tools of computer science and information security
[14]. Digital forensic experts use their skills and tools to generate circumstantial evidence of the
integrity and trustworthiness of the evidence, or they provide evidence and opinion testimony
attacking the authenticity of electronic information.
When calling upon such an expert to establish authenticity, care must be taken to ensure that the chain
of custody has been securely maintained to refute any suggestion of possible adulteration. A break in
or plausible doubt about the chain of custody from the time it is collected, transported, preserved, and
analyzed can severely weaken the weight and credibility of the digital evidence.
2.2 Expert Testimony and Daubert
Because the authenticity of digital evidence is generally determined by experts using scientific
methods beyond the knowledge and understanding of the lay juror, Daubert challenges to the
admissibility of expert testimony should be anticipated. An expert may provide opinion testimony
under Rule 702 if it is based on “scientific knowledge” that will help the jurors “understand or
determine a fact in issue” [11] With regard to digital evidence, the fact usually at issue is whether the
electronic information can be relied on as pure and unadulterated.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court laid down guidelines by which a
trial judge is to decide if “the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically
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valid” and reliable. The Daubert Court provided a non-exhaustive list of factors the judge must
consider in deciding whether to permit the expert testimony:


Whether the theories and techniques employed by the expert have been tested



Whether they have been subjected to peer review and publication



Whether the techniques employed by the expert have a known error rate



Whether they are subject to standards governing their application



Whether the theories and techniques enjoy widespread acceptance [7].

The list above is neither inclusive nor definitive, and testimony may still be admissible if one or more
of the factors are unsatisfied [7]. Additionally, the Court has clarified that “the admissibility inquiry
must focus ‘solely’ on the expert’s ‘principles and methodology,’ and ‘not on the conclusions that they
generate’” [7]. “So, digital forensic evidence proposed for admission in court must satisfy two
conditions: it must be (1) relevant, arguably a very weak requirement, and (2) it must be ‘derived by
the scientific method’ and ‘supported by appropriate validation’” [22].
2.3 Best Evidence Rule vs. Printouts
There are still many lawyers who are surprised to learn that a printed version of a word processed
document will likely be deemed inadmissible under the best evidence rule, if challenged due to the
existence of the original digital document. The best evidence rule, collectively Rules 1001 through
1008, is designed to eliminate the risk that documentary evidence is really a fraud by requiring the
proponent to offer the original unless certain exceptions are met [11].
An issue created by digital documents is whether a paper copy of the original digital version satisfies
the best evidence rule when the digital document contains metadata. Metadata is embedded
information stored in electronically created materials, but which is not visible when the digital
document is printed. Usually metadata is not even seen when viewing the digital document on a
computer monitor through an application software program. For example, a word processing
document automatically creates metadata that describes the document, its author, its date of creation,
and the dates on which changes were made, if any. As for email, metadata will tell you who was
blind-copied or when it was read, while the paper printout will not reveal such nuggets. In some
cases, metadata can be hugely relevant. In others, it may have no value, and its paper counterpart will
suffice.
Once sources of potentially relevant electronic information have been identified, thought must be
given to the proper process for collecting, transporting, preserving, analyzing, and producing it in a
fashion that will not destroy its potential admissibility. The most cautious approach would entail
retaining a digital forensic expert to assist with the process and to assist with the authentication of the
evidence, as needed.
3. CHANGES TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
The new Rules recognize the importance of electronic information. Indeed, it is now a requirement to
discuss the preservation of digital information before the court’s scheduling conference and at
discovery-planning conferences [10]. The Rules give digital documents the same weight and status as
paper in terms of production [10]. The revisions underscore the fundamental shift of modern litigation
towards the inclusion of electronic information in the process. Although the implications of these
changes will not be clear until they are tested, demand has and will continue to increase for properly
performed data collection and digital forensics investigations.
3.1 Rule 16(b): Pretrial Conferences, Scheduling, Management
The changes to Rule 16(b) now explicitly encourage parties to address ediscovery issues for possible
inclusion in the scheduling order. Parties that have not consulted a digital forensics specialist prior to
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conducting the Rule 26(f) planning conference with opposing counsel should seriously consider doing
so in order to be thoroughly educated about the issues and in order to thoroughly evaluate the various
discovery management and scheduling questions uniquely raised by digital evidence. Some of the
challenging issues to be considered include the types of media involved; the cost and methods of
collection, preservation, restoration, production, and analysis; possible cost sharing; the form in which
the digital evidence will be produced, such as native versus image; timing of the various phases;
custodians of digital evidence; treatment of privileged information, etc. Matters to which the parties
cannot agree prior to the scheduling order can certainly be resolved by the court and included in the
scheduling order to expedite discovery. Not only will digital forensics professionals be helpful to
assist the counsel and the court in resolving any e-discovery management issues, they also will be an
important part of the litigation support process.
Rule 16(b) also affords the parties the opportunity to enter into “clawback” agreements of their own
design, rather than relying exclusively on the default clawback contained in Rule 26(b)(5) [10].
Clawback agreements state that full production will proceed without privilege review, and that any
documents discovered to be privileged can be later removed from production without waiver of the
privilege. The agreement sets forth the terms and conditions by which a party that inadvertently
produces privileged information or work product can “claw” the information “back.” Generally, such
agreements must include a third party to ensure maximum effectiveness. However, these types of
agreements are a temporary solution to the general problem of removal of privileged documents from
electronic production for which there is no clear answer at this time.
Screening electronic documents for privilege is made substantially more difficult by the volume of
digital documents and by the informal and prolific nature of electronic communications, such as email,
instant messaging, and other chat programs [2,20]. Therefore, privilege review of electronic
information can quickly become costly and time-consuming. Further, the inclusion of metadata can be
a concern relating to privilege, and whether this information should be captured is a topic of
discussion during the discovery-planning conference. In recognition of these challenges, Rule
26(b)(5) also contains a clawback process. Despite the default provision of Rule 26(b)(5), counsel
should think through the benefits of reaching their own terms and conditions in light of any unique
aspects of each case, as permitted by Rule 16(b).
Attorneys should seriously consider consulting digital forensics specialists to assist in navigating
clawback and other discovery issues. Most companies and individuals that use information systems
are unaware of the types and locations of digital evidence may hide or linger. As such, the examiner
may be asked to inspect and review information systems and deployments through sampling before
making recommendations regarding discovery requests and preservation orders. Privileged documents
are a significant concern within these proceedings, and the digital forensics specialist may be the key
player in “clawback” agreements in order to facilitate reviews and exchanges.
3.2 Rule 26: General Provisions Governing Discovery, Duty of Disclosure
Rule 26(a)(1)(B) now makes clear that electronically stored information is included among the
documents and things that must be included in a party’s mandatory initial disclosures. If a party may
use digital evidence to support its claims or defenses, then the party must disclose a copy of the digital
evidence or a “description” of it “by category and location” [10]. To fulfill this obligation, counsel
will need to meet with the client’s key players, including information technologists, to compile the
necessary information to be included in the initial disclosures. Parties are now directed to also discuss
the form of electronic information production.
Rule 26(b)(2)(B) requires production of relevant, non-privileged, responsive digital information that is
“reasonably accessible” [10]. The change recognizes that certain forms of electronically stored
information are burdensome and costly to produce. If a party objects on the basis of undue burden or
cost of producing information that is not so readily accessible, the objecting party must prove the
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legitimacy of its objection. The Advisory Committee Notes point out that the requesting party may
need to conduct discovery to test the legitimacy of the objection.
Significantly, the Advisory Committee Notes instruct that the “responding party must also identify, by
category or type, the sources containing potentially responsive information that it is neither searching
nor producing. The identification should, to the extent possible, provide enough detail to enable the
requesting party to evaluate the burdens and costs of providing the discovery and the likelihood of
finding responsive information on the identified sources” [22]. Counsel should consider discussing
such matters at the Rule 26(f) scheduling and discovery planning conference.
The revisions to Rule 26(f) correspond to the modifications of Rule 16(b). For discovery planning and
litigation management purposes, Rule 26(f) directs the parties “to discuss any issues relating to
preserving discoverable information, and to develop a proposed discovery plan that” addresses “any
issues relating to disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information, including the form or
forms in which it should be produced” [10]. In that regard, the Advisory Committee Notes explain
that “volume and dynamic nature of electronically stored information may complicate preservation
obligations. The ordinary operation of computers involves both the automatic creation and the
automatic deletion or overwriting of certain information. Failure to address preservation issues early
in the litigation increases uncertainty and raises a risk of disputes” [10].
3.3 Rule 33: Interrogatories
The change to Rule 33(d) permits the responding party to answer an interrogatory by specifying the
records from which the answer may be derived and allowing the opposing party access to examine the
records. This option is available only where the burden of deriving that answer is substantially the
same for both parties. If the responding party chooses to respond by providing electronic information,
it must ensure that the interrogating party can access the information and ascertain the answer as easily
as the producing party.
3.4 Rule 34: Production of Documents, Electronically Stored Information, and Things
Originally, Rule 34 focused only on “documents” and “things,” but the term “documents” was later
amended to include “data compilations.” In years since, courts have interpreted the term “documents”
to include electronically stored information, which can be stored in forms that are different than they
would appear on paper. The new Rule 34(a) defines “documents” as including “electronically stored
information,” and the phrase is even included in the new title of the Rule, affirming that the discovery
of electronic data stands on equal footing with discovery of paper documents [10]. Therefore,
recipients of requests for production of “documents” now have a clear duty to assume the request
encompasses not only paper documents, but also all responsive electronically stored information,
regardless of the media on which it is retained.
The amendment to Rule 34(a) clarifies that the parties may request an opportunity to “test” or
“sample” responsive documents or other tangible things, including electronically stored information.
The Advisory Committee Notes caution, however, that this amendment was “not meant to create a
routine right of direct access to a party's electronic information system.” The Notes encourage parties
and courts to show due regard for issues of confidentiality and privacy and to guard against unjustified
intrusiveness.
Rule 34(b) has been modified to permit the requesting party “to specify the form or forms in which
electronically stored information is to be produced” [10]. If the requesting party fails to specify the
form, the respondent may specify the form or forms in which it will be produced. Regardless of the
form in which digital information is produced, Rule 34(a)(1) requires that it be “translated, if
necessary, by the respondent into reasonably usable form” [22]. Obviously, it remains to be seen how
courts will clarify the wide-open question of when the duty to translate digital information for the
opposing party’s use actually arises. However, resolving that question will likely require technical
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assistance, as will the steps necessary to translate the information once the duty is triggered.
If the requesting party specifies a form to which the respondent objects and the parties are unable to
reach an agreement, the respondent “must produce the information in a form or forms in which it is
ordinarily maintained or in a form or forms that are reasonably usable” [10]. Producing digital
information as it is ordinarily maintained means delivering the information in its native format as it is
stored on the device, which may mean including metadata. As a result, the common practice of
converting all documents derived from a digital device into TIF will be inadequate unless otherwise
agreed or ordered by the Court. Additionally, the production of unreadable slack space files may
require the examiner to extract and translate the relevant portions or provide a tool for parties to easily
read the information.
As usual, parties must meet and confer to resolve differences before moving to compel production in a
particular form. If a motion is filed, the Advisory Committee Notes explain that the court may decide
the form regardless of those proposed by the parties.
3.5 Rule 37: Failure to Make Disclosures or Cooperate in Discovery, Sanctions
Rule 37 was modified to include a new subsection (f), which creates a safe harbor from sanctions
when digital information is “lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic
information system” [10]. This change reflects the fact that the normal use of computer and other
electronic systems and devices results in the alteration or loss of digital information without regard for
litigation or other legal proceedings. Similarly, the destruction of digital information pursuant to a
records retention or information management policy, procedure, or practice is likewise encompassed
by the new safe harbor, which appropriately protects from sanctions any such innocent alterations or
losses. However, the Advisory Committee Notes emphasize that sanctions may be justified for the
deliberate loss or destruction of potentially relevant digital information, as well as for the negligent
failure to preserve from spoliation digital information that one should reasonably anticipate is relevant
to future litigation.
3.6 Rule 45: Subpoena
Rule 45 has been revised to ensure that electronically stored information can be sought from third
parties by subpoena. As usual, the burden of producing digital information and related costs may fall
on the responding party unless the responding party objects and persuades the court to shift or
reallocate the burden or costs of production. The Rule also states that the responding party need not
provide such discovery from devices that are not reasonably accessible unless otherwise ordered by
the court.
4. PRESERVATION AND PRODUCTION
For centuries, lawyers and their clients have had a legal duty to take reasonable steps to preserve
potentially relevant evidence from “spoliation” [2,13]. Spoliation is the intentional or negligent
destruction or alteration of evidence or the failure to preserve property for use as evidence in pending
or future litigation [13]. Absent a natural disaster or spilled mug of coffee, preserving paper evidence
poses few challenges. “Invisible” digital data is different, primarily due to sheer volume. It is cheap
and easy to store a mountain of magnetic data on a few computer hard drives, a server, or backup
tapes. The journey of a typical business email illustrates the exponential expansion of the universe of
digital evidence. One email creates a number of copies: one in the sent folder of the sender’s
computer; one on the sender’s hard drive; one on the email server; one on the recipient’s hard drive;
and potentially a fourth if the email is sent to or from a PDA. This digital footprint is very large. A
second difference is that innumerable innocent missteps can alter or destroy warehouses of
information. Even when properly preserved from spoliation, production in discovery is laden with its
own landmines. Making matters worse, courts are quick to sanction those who fail to properly
preserve or produce digital evidence.
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According to a thorough study of all opinions published during the years 2000 through 2004, whether
sanctions are imposed for failing to properly preserve or produce digital evidence turns on two factors,
the degree of culpability and the degree of prejudice [23]. The greater the degree of culpability, the
less evidence of prejudice is necessary to justify sanctions and vice versa. The study also found that
sanctions were granted 65% of the time with defendants being sanctioned four times more often than
plaintiffs. Of the cases where sanctions were imposed, 85% involved both the failure to preserve
evidence from spoliation and production delays; 49% were based on a finding of willfulness or bad
faith; 35% on prejudice; and 9% on mere negligence. When sanctions were granted, 60% included an
award of discovery costs or attorneys fees, 30% included evidence or witness preclusion; 23%
involved adverse inference jury instructions, and 28% involved two or more these remedies.
Several recent notorious cases graphically illustrate the dangers of failing to properly preserve and
production digital evidence. One of the early landmark ediscovery cases is a sex discrimination and
retaliation case, Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, which spawned numerous published opinions that
have provided guidelines for the management of digital forensics in modern litigation [28]. The
federal court sanctioned UBS for many things, including the failure to preserve backup tapes
containing highly relevant email and other digital evidence [28]. One sanction included an adverse
inference jury instruction. The instruction told the jury they could infer that UBS destroyed relevant
evidence because it may have been damaging to its defense. The jury awarded Zubulake, a Wall
Street equities trader, $9 million in lost wages and $20 million in punitive damages. Two other major
companies, Chevron and Morgan Stanley, have settled harassment suits for millions of dollars due to
inappropriate emails circulated within their offices.
The duty to preserve arises as soon as one knows or should have known that materials are relevant to a
pending suit or to reasonably anticipated future litigation [4,12]. In Zubulake, the court held that the
duty to preserve arose at the earliest when UBS managers began to fear that Zubulake may file suit.
At the latest, the duty arose when Zubulake filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the federal agency responsible for investigating alleged
employment discrimination [3,18,28].
In another prominent case involving sanctions, Prudential Insurance was fined $1 million after having
been found to have negligently destroyed documents [15]. All employees were notified of the
litigation, and Prudential was ordered to promulgate a document retention policy.
Arguably the most infamous ediscovery sanctions case resulted in a $1.4 billion jury verdict against
Morgan Stanley for securities fraud [5]. Due to the degree of culpability of Morgan Stanley and its
attorneys – who not only knowingly failed to properly preserve and produce digital evidence, but also
lied to the court about it – the court granted default judgment against Morgan Stanley on the issue of
liability. The only issue before the jury was the amount of damages to assess. A sample of Morgan
Stanley’s abuses include the failure to locate a large number of relevant backup tapes, failure to notify
both counsel and court of discovered tapes, and lying to the court about compliance with a
preservation and production order. Additionally, they were found to have relied on flawed software
written by their in-house information technology staff while searching electronic evidence, including
use of an erroneous date range to search for emails and a failure to capture email attachments.
The key to properly preserving and producing digital evidence is promptly developing a thorough plan
with counsel and the client’s key players. When litigation or an investigation is reasonably anticipated,
clients should engage counsel to help design, implement, and monitor a “litigation hold.” A litigation
hold is a “freeze” on a client’s normal document retention and destruction policies, procedures, and
practices. The litigation hold is a process designed to preserve all documents and data that may be
relevant to the litigation. It covers information reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence, and information reasonably likely to be requested during discovery. The client
must educate its employees about the process and monitor compliance [17]. Although the client is
primarily responsible for preserving and producing evidence, the litigation hold process should be
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“periodically re-issued so that new employees are aware of it, and so that it is fresh in the minds of all
employees” [28]. The amount of money awarded in both verdicts and sanctions, combined with the
multitude of costly missteps by high-profile companies, highlights the complexity of the preservation
and production problem all businesses and their counsel face.
5. DIGITAL EVIDENCE
While the new Rules have addressed the discovery of electronic information, many of the reported
decisions address evidentiary challenges to the admissibility of digital evidence at trial. Not
surprisingly, most of the published digital evidence decisions are criminal cases. Long before
embarking down the road of discovery, counsel must seriously evaluate the significant road blocks to
the ultimate admissibility of digital evidence that are created by ineffective methods of identifying,
collecting, restoring, producing, and analyzing it.
Whether the investigation is civil or criminal, the forensic investigation process begins with collection.
If performed incorrectly, the evidence could be inadmissible. Currently, the most popular tool for
collecting and investigating digital evidence, specifically computer hard drives, is EnCase from
Guidance Software Inc [2,20]. To perform collection, examiners use software such as EnCase Imager
and/or hardware to copy the hard disk completely without modification byte by byte [8,16]. This
process is called “mirror imaging” or “forensics copying,” and this methodology is admissible in court
as exemplified by State v. Cook, 777 N.E.2d 882 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002). In this case, a defendant
appealed his conviction based on the inadmissibility of evidence generated from a mirror image taken
off of his hard drive. After a detailed discussion of the mirror imaging process, the authenticity of the
data taken from the image, and the possibility for tampering, the appellate court found that the trial
court properly admitted the evidence. Id. at 886-88.
Other copying methods, such as common disk imaging, duplication, and drag-and-drop, do not
preserve all of the potentially relevant data [2,6,8]. As a result, such methods provide incomplete
collection results and create potent impeachment material for opposing counsel and may raise barriers
to admissibility. Indeed, multiple courts have directed third-party, independent forensic examiners to
provide a “mirror image” or “clone” of a computer hard drive in order to fulfill the court’s discovery
requirements [19,21,24,25,27].
Courts are continually refining their requirements for creating evidence grade copies of digital
information. In Taylor v. State, 93 S.W.3d 487, 507 (Tex. App. 2002), the court recognized the
importance of creating hashes of the copied computer to prove resulting copies were not modified. A
hash value is a small digital fingerprint of data commonly used to test if data has been altered. In this
case, the court overturned a criminal conviction, in part, because the investigating officer did not make
note of the hash values, thereby introducing doubt as to the authenticity of the data and any resulting
analysis [26].
Counsel should stay abreast of these evidentiary developments regarding digital evidence, and the new
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are certain to result in more definitive rulings regarding the
collection and investigation of digital evidence. Lawyers face potential malpractice claims if they
negligently fail to advise their clients regarding effective methods of digital discovery that are
designed to minimize or completely avoid admissibility problems.
6. CONCLUSIONS
As digital devices become more pervasive, the amount of electronic information used in the legal
landscape will continue to explode. The complexity of such devices and the changeable nature of such
information have led to confusion and consternation regarding the appropriate treatment of digital
discovery and the admissibility of electronic evidence. The changes to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have outlined a basic set of procedures for professionals facing these issues. However, these
changes are merely the first step in the evolution of the use of electronic information in the legal
profession.
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